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Appellant Frank K. Gilroy, through his counsel of
record, submits this Reply Brief in support of his appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.
UTAH'S "CATCH-ALL" STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO PETITIONS FOR
PATERNITY.
Appellee argues, in a complete breakdown of logic,
that the two specific statutes of limitations applicable to
suits for support and education of a child should somehow
result in no statute of limitations for an "action solely
for paternity."

(Appellee's brief, pg. 10). Appellee

contends that this Court should not apply the four year
"catch-all" statute of limitation (Utah Code Ann. §78-1225(3)), because "the legislature already provided its own,
different types of limitation in the Paternity Act" and "if
the Utah State Legislature intended to limit a petition
based solely to establish paternity, certainly such a
statute would be enacted." Id.

However, Appellee not only

ignores the clear language of section 78-12-25(3) by asking
this Court to render application of the statute an
impossibility, she has attempted to side step (1) the clear
dicta and ruling in Szarak v. Sandoval. 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah
1981), (2) the long and extensive application of the "catch-

1

all" statute of limitations in other cases by this Court,
and (3) case law in other jurisdictions.
A.

Dicta in Utah Case Law Clearly Establishes that a
Petition for Paternity is Subject to the Four Year
Statute of Limitations.

In the case of Szarak v. Sandoval, supra, Justice Oaks
writing for a unanimous Court stated that it was unnecessary
to rule on the issue of whether the "catch-all" statutes
were considered by the Court in Nielson v. Hansen, 564 P.2d
1113 (Utah 1977).

Rather than deciding the issue of whether

a paternity action is governed by the three year statute of
limitations "for liability created by the statutes of this
State" (section 78-12-26), or the four year statute for any
"action for relief not otherwise provided by law" (section
78-12-25(3)), Justice Oaks simply reasoned that section 7812-36 tolled the applicable statute of limitations "during
the period of the child's minority."

636 P.2d at 1085.

However, at no time did the Court even hint that no statute
of limitation applies to paternity actions.

Moreover, the

Court's holding that .i I i3lling occurred during minority
could only result if there was an underlying statute of
limitation.

Without a statute of limitations, there would

be absolutely nothing to toll.

Appellee's argument

completely fails to address how the Court in Szarak v.

Sandoval could toll a non-existent or non-applicable statute
of limitations, as Appellee suggests.
Throughout Justice Oaks' opinion, the Court referenced
no fewer than 5 times the existence of a statute of
limitations applicable to paternity actions1; yet, no
reference was ever made by the Court that if the Utah State
Legislature intended to limit a petition for paternity, it
would have done so.

Therefore, consistent with the dicta

and tolling result of Szarak v. Sandoval, as well as the
"public policy considerations" regarding support of minor
children voiced in Nielson v. Hansen. 564 P.2d at 1114, this
Court should reverse the Trial Court's denial of Appellant's
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint because Appellee is an adult
and over 20 years have passed since the four year statute
ran and the commencement of her suit.

1

The five references are: (1) . . . "another statute
precludes the application of any period of limitation
against the plaintiffs in the circumstances of this case."
636 P.2d at 1084; (2) " . . . § 78-12-36 would clearly
prevent the statute of limitations from barring a paternity
and child support action . . ." 63 6 P.2d at 1084; (3) "While
the child's action to establish paternity and enforce child
support is not barred by the statute of limitations until
after the child attains majority . . ." 636 P.2d at 10841085; (4) "Is the statute of limitations also tolled during
the child's minority for a paternity and child support
action . . . " 636 P.2d at 1085; and (5) "Consequently, we
hold that any statute limiting the time within which a
paternity action must be commenced under the Uniform Act on
Paternity is tolled . . . " 636 P.2d 1085.
3

B.

Utah Courts Have Consistently the Four Year
Statute of Limitations Where No Specific Statute
of Limitations Could be Found.

Appellee has ignored the long line of Utah cases
applying the four year "catch-all" statute where there was
no specific statute of limitations.

Olsen v. Hooley, 865

P.2d 1345, 1347 fn.l (Utah 1993) ("intentional infliction of
emotional distress ... is not subject to a specific
statutory limitations period [and therefore] is governed by
the residual four-year limitations period found in section
78-12-25(3)"); Atwood v. Sturm, Rucrer's Co., 823 P.2d 1064
(Utah 1992) (products liability claim against manufacturer
for injury by pistol was subject to the general four-year
statute of limitations); Stevensen v. Monson, 856 P.2d 355,
1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (an action against a county is not
subject to a 6 month statute of limitations but is subject
to the four year catch all statute); Whatcott v. Whatcott,
790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (psychological injury from
alleged sexual abuse during childhood was subject to the
general four-year statute of limitations); See also, Parker
v. Weber County Irr. Dist., 251 P. 11 (Utah 1926), applying
Comp. Laws Utah §6474 (1917), later codified as Utah Code
Ann. §104-2-30 (1943), the predecessor "catch-all" statute
of limitations to section 78-12-85(3), which read, "An
action for relief not otherwise provided for must be

4

commenced within four years after the cause of action shall
have accrued.11; Brantina v. Salt Lake City. 153 P. 995 (Utah
1915);

Fullerton v. Bailey, 53 P. 1020 (Utah 1898).

Furthermore, in American Turret Corp. v. City of W.
Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court
reviewed the long history of applying the "catch-all"
statute and reaffirmed that the catch all statute of
limitations " to all actions, both legal and equitable, in
which affirmative relief is sought."

840 P.2d at 760. The

Court next concluded that before applying the "catch-all"
statute it must first satisfy itself that "Utah's current
statutes of limitation do not contain a more specific
provision."

Id.

Finding no specific statute of limitation,

the Court held that the four year "catch-all" statute .
Therefore, this Court should follow the long line of
cases applying section 78-12-25(3) and its predecessor to
actions for relief where no specific statute of limitations
applies.

Because Appellee's claim for "affirmative relief"

was filed more than 20 years after the four year statute had
run, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's ruling and
direct the Trial Court to dismiss Appellee's complaint with
prejudice for failing to file timely her action.

5

C.

Case Law in Other Jurisdictions Supports a Holding
that Appellee's Paternity Action is Governed by
the Catch-all Statute of Limitations.

Courts which have addressed the issue of whether a
general statute of limitations applies to an action to
establish paternity where no specific statute of limitation
existed generally involved children under the age of
majority.

See generally, 59 A.L.R. 3rd 685 (1974) "Statute

of Limitations and Illegitimacy or Bastardly Proceedings".
See also, Payne v. Prince George Dept. of Social Services,
507 A.2d 641 (Md. App. 1986) (the three-year catch-all
statute of limitation, but tolled the statute during the
minority of the child); Ortega v. Portales. 307 P.2d 193,
195 (Colo. 1957) (Court refused to apply three year statute
of limitations during minority of child, finding that there
was a "continuing liability" upon the father "until said
child has attained the age of eighteen years."); State v.
Steinbaugh, 138 N.E.2d 252 (Ohio 1939) (Court held that
statute of limitations had no bearing and the Court had
continuing jurisdiction at any time "while the child is
still of an age that requires support."); Miller v.
Townsend. 514 N.E.2D 325 (Ind. App. 1987) (tolled the
statute during the minority of the child); Spada v. Pauley,
385 N.W.2d 746 (Mich. App. 1984) (tolled the statute during
the minority of the child).

6

However, in the case of Torres v. Cautino's Heirs, 185
F.2d 788 (1st Cir. 1950), the First Circuit Court of Appeals
considered a paternity action brought by an adult and upheld
the dismissal of his claim for untimely filing.

In that

case the plaintiff, a 37 year old man, filed suit in the
Federal Court for Puerto Rico seeking that he be declared
and acknowledged as a legitimate son or acknowledged natural
son of Genar Cautino-Insua.

The plaintiff was born January

10, 1909, and filed his suit on August 8, 1946.

The

District Court concluded that since there was no specific
statute of limitations, the plaintiff's complaint was
subject to a "catch-all" statute of limitation providing for
a term of 15 years.

The District Court further ruled that

the 15 years statute was tolled during the age of minority
of the plaintiff.

Accordingly, the District Court ruled

that because the 37 year old adult plaintiff had obtained
majority on January 10, 193 0, the 15 year period expired on
January 10, 1945, over a year before the action was
commenced.

This decision was ultimately affirmed by both

the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and the First Circuit.
Therefore, this Court should follow the logic and
holding of the First Circuit in Torres v. Cautino's Heirs.
supra, and reverse Judge Iwasaki's denial of Appellant's

7
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